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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
“P” for Partnership or “R” 
for Regime?
A Pamphlet on TTIP and the Fragmentation of 
International Law
A response to Maximilian Oehl and Jelena Bäumler
In their attentive and stimulating posts, Maximilian Oehl and 
Jelena Bäumler considered the condition of the WTO and 
the role of public debate for TTIP differently. My intention is 
to take a step back and to reflect on the “important 
questions relating to the framing of the debate” as 
Maximilian Oehl put it.
Maximilian Oehl started his text spelling out the 
abbreviation TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment 

Partnership). But why is it called “Partnership” and not 
“Treaty”? Besides the perhaps unwished acronym TTIT it 
could be elucidating to take into account the fragmentation 
of international law and its theory. Fundamental concerns 
towards TTIP and the hegemony of the international 
economic law regime can be analyzed and brought into the 
debate by linking such a critical examination of TTIP to the 
reality of fragmentation in international law.
Fragmentation: Various Actors, Various Regimes
There are a wide range of actors referring to international 
law in their sayings and doings. Not only states, but also 
non-state actors play a crucial role and participate in 
international standard setting processes. International law 
has undergone not only a proliferation in the number and 
character of actors, but there has also been a substantive 
fragmentation into different “regimes”. This evaluation of the 
status of international law was put forward prominently by 
Gerhard Hafner in a UN record from the year 2000 and 
Martti Koskenniemi in his report of the study group of the 
ILC concerning the fragmentation of international law in 
2006. Their finding is that every legal regime has its own 
range and dynamic. It has been taken up since by many 
scholars and has been discussed widely.
Therefore the main question for fixing a problem effectively 
in international law nowadays has turned from: What does 
international law say to the facts of a case, to “which 
international legal regime should deal with the problem?” 
Connected to each legal regime are special legal means and 
tools for settling raised issues. For example the system of 
collective security is not the appropriate instrument to stop 
environmental pollution. But legal regimes occasionally 
collide with each other and claim validity and force at the 
same time. TTIP is a case in point.
WTO vs Partnerships?
How does the partnership invoked in the title of TTIP work? 
Maximilian Oehl’s cogent main thesis can be summed up as 
follows: free trade and investment cooperation will only 
work well if there is a harmonic relationship in related fields 
aside from these two. That means the two tumbling great 
powers expand strategic cooperation in those areas affected 
by free trade and investment collaboration and protection, 
such as environmental standards, labor legislation, or 
consumer protection. The integrative force for partnership 
is built on this two-sided economic law regime.
In light of fragmentation, the different opinions of Jelena 
Bäumler and Maximilian Oehl concerning the further role of 
the WTO within the international economic law regime 
could be described as just the tip of the iceberg. The 
functional and regional division of international economic 
law is an expression for the endeavor of the particular logic 
of this regime to universalize its own rationality and 
maximize its regime power. By further fragmenting into 
global and sub-global regimes, international economic law 
regime takes the line of the least resistance to fulfill its logic. 
Thus the WTO and TTIP are different means to advance the 
same regime purpose. According to this interpretation, the 
competition of different economic systems turns out to be 
just an observation of the rules of the game set by the 
regime. With this more general view, a critique of TTIP may 
also be lifted to another level.
International Lawyers as “Miserable Comforters”
In his article Miserable Comforters (“leidige Tröster”), 
alluding to Kant’s famous treatise Perpetual Peace, Martti 
Koskenniemi applied such a view and came to the 
conclusion: “The world of regimes is a world of hegemony, of 
pure power.” Like Kant, Koskenniemi advances the opinion 
that international law is the origin for many frustrations. And 
Heinhard Steiger went so far as to claim that Kant himself 
was a denier of international law. If Kant’s resentment refers 
to abusing international law in order to justify war and 
power politics at his time, Koskenniemi tackles a 
hierarchical world order and hegemonic interstate relations. 
The regime conflicts and legal collisions reflect a hidden 
struggle between different interests and logics in global 
society. International lawyers habitually apologize for this 
world order with reference to valid legal rules governing 
international relations.
Hegemonic Corollaries
The public concerns related to TTIP about for instance the 
decreasing protection for employees, dangerous genetically 
modified corn, or declining environmental standards express 
the fear of universal hegemonic rationalization caused by 
the international economic law regime. Food safety, 
environmental protection or employment standards could 
be absorbed into the particular logic of the international 
economic law regime that exclusively endeavors to 
maximize profits. TTIP-critics also address these hegemonic 
corollaries in terms of a threat to democracy (see e.g. STOP-
TTIP or Global Justice Now).
Each legal regime strives for maximization of its own 
rationality (“Eigenrationalitätsmaximierung”) as Andreas 
Fischer-Lescano and Gunter Teubner pointed out with 
reference to Niklas Luhmann. A legal regime universalizes its 
own particular logic with the support of the general abstract 
language of international law and thus penetrates more and 
more legal fields.
The way in which the legal question is posed by international 
lawyers in dispute settlement with regard to e.g. the 
precautionary principle already articulates lucidly the 
priority of that regime in case of collision with others. Under 
free trade policies lawyers do not ask whether the trading in 
a particular food is a legitimate interest to accept a possible 
health hazard for human beings. Instead the question is put 
in that way: Does a presumptive, in its extent uncertain risk 
for human health justify a restriction of free trade? More 
democratic participation in the risk management and 
assessment process under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures has already been proposed by 
some authors as an example for developments towards 
balancing this one-sidedness in legal treatment.
Politicizing Legal Regimes
From such an interpretative viewpoint, the international 
economic law regime favors the principle of free trade as 
opposed to and in the same time looking for balance with 
the precautionary principle. Samantha Besson characterizes 
the traditional philosophical supposition of international 
law-making as identifying principles with natural law and 
criticizes it. It is from this contested assumption that 
principles, such as the principle of free trade and the 
precautionary principle as its counterprinciple, appear from 
nature with a shine of immutability. One of the most famous 
representatives of the critical legal studies movement, 
Roberto Unger, has shown that the endurance of the 
international economic law regime arises from the dialectics 
of principle and counterprinciple. At the same time this 
perpetuates its appearance as immutable. Nevertheless 
principles are alterable, first and foremost through the 
political process.
So I think Jelena Bäumler and others are partly right: in the 
end TTIP is a political choice. But it is a political choice in a 
given frame strongly influenced by the languages and logics 
of legal regimes, especially the international economic law 
regime. Considering TTIP as a real political choice does not 
mean, to paraphrase the author and poetess Ingeborg 
Bachmann, to adopt certain regime languages in order to 
assess chances and opportunities resulting from this 
political decision. Rather it is necessary to examine and 
revise critically the language in public debates to break the 
hermeneutic circle described by Maximilian Oehl. Our 
important task as legal scholars is to contribute to that. Such 
constant revisions are essential to acquaint oneself with new 
perceptions, ways of thinking, and feelings to extend one’s 
own reasoning and enable options for future actions.
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